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 GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM EXISTENCE WITH ASSET-BACKED
SECURITIZATION
MARIANO STEINERT AND JUAN PABLO TORRES-MART¶ INEZ
Abstract. We propose a speci¯cation of a general equilibrium model with securitization of
collateral-backed promises and discuss the role of physical collateral to avoid, in equilibrium,
pessimistic beliefs about the future rates of default. Promises are pooled in either pass-through
securities or collateralized loans obligations (CLO), allowing the existence of di®erent seniority lev-
els among tranches in the same CLO. In case of default, borrowers may also su®er extra-economic
penalties, which are internalized into a structure of non-ordered preferences. In this context, we
prove the existence of an equilibrium in that investors are not over-pessimistic about the payments
of derivatives.
Keywords. Asset Backed-Securitization, Extra-economic Default Penalties, Collateral, Non-
ordered Preferences.
JEL Classification: D52, D91.
1. Introduction
In ¯nancial markets, securitization of debt contracts has been a mean for ¯nancial institutions to
reduce risk in their balance sheets. Moreover, it allows better portfolio diversi¯cation, as investors
have access to a broader pool of assets. In this sense, securitization has an important role in
improving e±ciency.
Assets that are issued to diversify the credit risk are traditionally called Asset Backed Securities
(ABS), when protected by a pool of loans or receivables, and Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS),
when backed by residential or commercial mortgage loans. However, a consensus does not exist
about the di®erentiation of the two classes.
1 For simplicity, we consider the Mortgage Backed
Securities as particular types of ABS.
From the risk distribution perspective, there are two ways a given poll of assets (e.g. loans,
mortgage, receivables, bonds) can be securitized into a family of ABS: 1) allowing the amount of
default to be divided pro-rata among the di®erent ABS; or 2) allowing senior-subordinated structures
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among the di®erent derivatives at the moment of payments. When payments are distributed pro-
rata, ABS are also called Pass-through securities. On the other hand, when there is a senior-
subordinated structure among the ABS, they are called Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLO) or
tranches. When the underlying loans are mortgages, we could also refer to CLO as Collateralized
Mortgage Obligations (CMO).
Our objective is to insert these structures in a general equilibrium model, generalizing the seminal
works that extend the traditional General Equilibrium Model to allow for credit risk, collateral and
extra-economic penalties (see Geanakoplos [10], Geanakoplos and Zame [11] and Dubey, Geanakoplos
and Shubik [7]). Moreover, we are interested in studying the role of physical collateral requirements
to avoid excess of investor pessimism about the future rates of default.
Our economy has two time periods and there is uncertainty about the state of nature in the
second period. Commodities may be durable, assets are real, and a ¯nite number of agents, which are
characterized by non-ordered preferences, can trade on spot markets. There are two types of ¯nancial
contracts available in these markets: (i) primitive securities, that are sold by the borrowers and are
backed by physical collateral requirements, that can depend of the prices; and (ii) derivatives, which
are bought by the lenders and are backed by classes of primitives. In the case of default, borrowers are
burdened by both the seizure of collateral requirements and by extra-economic penalties, which are
incorporated into our structure of preferences. These extra-economic penalties re°ect the existence
of legal or moral enforcements and may di®er among agents.
We suppose that ¯nancial intermediaries, whose role is limited to pool individual claims, buy the
debts and issue derivatives. These ABS may be (i) families of tranches, which receive payments
following a senior-subordinated structure, guaranteeing that tranches with lower priority receive
nothing unless those with higher priority are fully paid; or (ii) Pass-through securities. The value of
aggregate derivatives purchases must match, at equilibrium, the value of short sales on primitives.
Moreover, as ¯nancial markets are anonymous, lenders take the rates of payment of the derivatives
as given. At equilibrium, these rates are determined in such manner that the total value of deliveries
matches the total value of payments.
Given this context, suppose that (i) prices of primitive assets are zero, and (ii) lenders are over-
pessimistic, in the sense that they expect to su®er total default at each state of nature. Then agents
can not borrow anything at the ¯rst period, and lenders can not expect to receive any payment
at the second period. Therefore, assets are not traded and a pure spot market equilibrium always
exists. However, assets are protected by physical collateral requirements and goods are durable.
Thus, it is not rational that lenders expect to su®er total default in a derivative, whenever both the
depreciated collateral and the original promises of their primitives have positive values.
Hence, using the fact that promises are backed by physical collateral requirements, we propose
and show the existence of an equilibrium re¯nement, called non-trivial equilibrium, in which over-
pessimistic beliefs are ruled out. A non-trivial equilibrium will be an equilibrium in which agents
can expect to su®er total default, in a given state of nature, only on derivatives that are backed by
primitives that have either zero real promises or zero depreciated bundle of collateral requirements.M. Steinert and J.P. Torres-Mart¶ ³nez 3
1.1. Insertion in Literature and Contributions. The study of securitization structures in a
general equilibrium context, in which agents can default in their promises, has experienced an
increasing importance over the last few years. Geanakoplos [10] and Geanakoplos and Zame [11]
studied the existence of an equilibrium in models in which borrowers are burdened by collateral
requirements in order to protect lenders from credit risk. In these models of collateralized loans,
the only enforcement in case of default is the seizure of the collateral. Therefore, borrowers make
strategic default and trade directly with lenders, that expect to receive the minimum between the
depreciated value of the collateral and the value of the original promises. In this context, equilibrium
existence follows from the scarceness of physical collateral requirements, which guarantees that short
sales are bounded at equilibrium.
Extensions of these models, allowing endogenous collateral requirements, were made recently
by Araujo, Fajardo and P¶ ascoa [2] and Martins-da-Rocha and Torres-Mart¶ ³nez [13]. In order to
overcome the non convexity induced by assets returns, in a context in which borrowers can choose
their collateral guarantees, Araujo, Fajardo and P¶ ascoa [2] suppose that there exists a continuum
of agents that trade assets. Financial intermediaries pool the debts of borrowers associated with
a given promise and issue a single derivative security, which is bought by the lenders. Investors
expect to receive, at each state of nature in the future, the mean value of the payments made by
the debtors. In a similar context, but with a ¯nite number of agent types, Martins-da-Rocha and
Torres-Mart¶ ³nez [13] neutralize the non-convexity on asset returns allowing lenders to raise capital
by securitizing part of these assets. In both models, equilibrium with endogenous collateral always
exists.
Our ¯nancial structure di®ers from their models in at least two aspects: (i) in our model, ¯nancial
intermediaries can issue more than one derivative, allowing Pass-through derivatives and senior-
subordinated structures; (ii) although we allow collateral requirements that can depend on prices,
borrowers can not choose directly their guarantees.
Other types of models allow default without physical collateral requirements, but they burden
borrowers by extra-economic penalties, proportional to the real value of default. In this context,
Zame [16] studies the advantages of default in order to promote e±ciency and Dubey, Geanakoplos
and Shubik [7] prove the existence of an equilibrium in a two-period model with incomplete markets.
As we do not assume the existence of utility functions, the linear utility penalties used in the
articles above do not make sense in our framework. Therefore, we allow extra-economic enforcements
in a broader sense, internalizing the default punishments into the non-ordered preferences. As a
particular case, we obtain the representation of preferences used by Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik
[7].
Furthermore, models in which agents take payment rates of assets as given can have a pure
spot market equilibrium, whose existence can be easily proved. As explained before, this problem
comes from very pessimistic beliefs of lenders about future rates of payment. In order to avoid this
pathology and to allow assets to be traded at equilibrium, it is interesting to re¯ne this equilibrium
concept.4 Asset Backed Securitization
In this direction, Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik [7] propose a re¯nement concept as a limit of
abstract "-boosted equilibriums, in which an abstract agent (that can be interpreted as a govern-
ment) buys and sells " units of each asset and gives no default at each state of nature. Hence, for a
¯xed ", lenders are not very pessimistic, as they perfectly foresee strictly positive payments for each
asset. By taking the limit, when " goes to zero, they obtain a re¯ned equilibrium.
In our model, as primitives are backed by physical bundles, we can introduce another re¯nement
concept using the fact that primitive assets deliver, in case of default, at least the depreciated value
of the collateral. Thus, as explained before, lenders expect to receive a positive payment when the
physical collateral, associated to the underlying primitives, does not disappear from the economy.
Although we can not guarantee that assets are traded at equilibrium, our re¯nement concept assures
that the absence of negotiation, when it is the case, is not a consequence of over-pessimistic beliefs.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model; in Section 3, we state the de¯ni-
tion of Equilibrium with Asset-Backed Securitization; in Section 4 we discuss the role of collateral to
avoid over-pessimistic beliefs, and state our re¯nement concept; and Section 5 is devoted to analyze
the assumptions and to state our main result about existence. After some concluding remarks, we
make the proof of equilibrium existence in the Appendix.
2. Model
We consider a two-period economy in which agents have uncertainty about the future state of
nature. Time periods are denoted by t 2 f0;1g and we suppose that at the ¯rst period, t = 0, there
is no uncertainty (i.e., only one state of nature, denoted by s = 0, is reached). At the second period,
t = 1, a state of nature is revealed among a ¯nite number of possibilities, s 2 S. For convenience of
notation, we put S¤ = f0g [ S to denote the set of states of nature in the economy.
At each state s 2 S¤ a ¯nite number of perfect divisible commodities l 2 L are negotiated in
spot markets. These goods can be durable at the ¯rst period and, as in Geanakoplos [10] and
Geanakoplos and Zame [11], they may su®er depreciation contingent to the state of nature at the
second period. This structure, given by linear transformations that are represented by matrixes
Ys 2 R
L£L
+ , guarantees that when an agent chooses a bundle x at t = 0, he expects to receive a
bundle Ys x if the state of nature s 2 S is reached.2 Note that this structure is general enough to
allow perishable goods and perfect durable goods as particular cases.
2With more notation, we could have personalized depreciation functions. Moreover, we could also have a depreci-
ation structure characterized by concave functions and we would still be able to guarantee equilibrium. However, as
we let the seizure of the depreciated physical collateral requirements be a mechanism of enforcement of the promises
payments, it would not be clear what would be the depreciated collateral bundle when a borrower consume more than
the required collateral. Take for example the following case: There exists only one good and its depreciation is given
by Ys(x) =
p
x for all states of nature. If a borrower is obligated to constitute 1 unit of collateral and he decides
to consume a total of 4 units of the good, we have that his depreciated bundle at each state is 2 units of the good.
What would be his depreciated collateral bundle? Ys(1) = 1,
Ys(4)
4 = 1
2 or Ys(4) ¡ Ys(3) = 2 ¡
p
3 » = 0:27. All being
perfctly reasonable answers, but di®erent from each other. On the other hand, with linear depreciation functions the
three cases above would be equal.M. Steinert and J.P. Torres-Mart¶ ³nez 5
Commodities in L are traded, at state s 2 S¤, at prices ps 2 RL
+. We will denote the commodity
price process as p = (ps)S
s=0 and, as usual, we suppose that all physical goods are in positive net
supply, that is, there exists physical endowments Ws 2 RL
++, at each state s 2 S¤.
A ¯nite number of agents, h 2 H, trades commodities at every state, choosing consumption
allocations in the commodity space Xs = RL
+. The space of consumption in the economy is given by
X = ¦s2S¤Xs. Moreover, as in Gale and Mas-Collel [8], at each state of nature the agents receive an
initial nominal income given by functions mh
s(ps) ¸ 0. Note that if we suppose that agents receive,
at each state s 2 S¤, a physical endowment !h
s 2 RL
+, the usual framework of general equilibrium
models, mh
s(ps) = ps!h
s, is a particular case of this structure of income functions. We use this
general structure to overcome the survival assumption, i.e. !h = (!h
s)s2S À 0 for all h 2 H.3
In our economy, we consider a ¯nancial structure in which assets are subject to credit risk. We
allow borrowers to negotiate real securities, called primitive assets, which are subject to default
and backed by physical collateral requirements, which can depend on the price level. On the other
side, ¯nancial intermediaries, which are limited to pool individual claims, make an asset-backed
securitization of these debts contracts, selling derivatives to the lenders.
To give credit risk protection, it is su±cient to impose mechanisms on the ¯nancial structure of
original loans, in order to burden borrowers in case of default. On this direction, we suppose that
enforcements mechanisms, as the seizure of the physical collateral requirements or the punishment
via extra-economic penalties, are allowed.
We divide primitive assets into di®erent classes and, for a given class of these debts contracts, we
allow the existence of a ¯nite number of derivatives. These derivatives can be of two types: (i) pass-
through securities (i.e. the payments made by the original promises are distributed pro rata among
the derivatives) and (ii) collateralized loans obligations (CLO), also called tranches, (i.e. securities
that have associated an exogenous seniority structure, establishing an order in which derivatives
should be payed). For sake of simplicity, only one type of derivative is associated with a given
class of primitive assets. In equilibrium, analogous to Araujo, Fajardo and P¶ ascoa [2], the value of
the aggregate short sales must match the value of its derivatives aggregate purchase within each
family of derivatives. In this sense, our model does not allow, at equilibrium, overcollateralization
of asset-backed securities.
Remark 1. Although, in real ¯nancial markets Collateralized Loan Obligations have an important
role protecting lenders from prepayment risk, in our model the main goal of this structure is to give
lenders more protection from default risk as we work with a two-period model.
In a multi-period model, prepayment risk appears when borrowers have an incentive to pay their
promises before the period that was established when they took the loan. However, as derivative
promises are state contingent, the amount received as a prepayment need to be reinvested by the
issuer of the derivatives in order to pay the future commitments. If ¯nancial intermediaries do not
3One way of seeing this is considering another example of income function: mh
s(ps) = ps!h
s (ps), where we let
the physical endowment to be a function of prices ps. In this setting we can replace the assumption !h
s À 0 for
ps!h
s (ps) > 0 whenever ps 6= 0. This allows that, for each price ps, !h
s (ps) do not need to be interior.6 Asset Backed Securitization
have others investment opportunities available, which would give enough return to pay in full the
derivatives, the prepayments made by the borrowers can generate default to the investors, without
the existence of any default in the primitives.
Formally, a ¯nite number of primitive assets k 2 K can be sold at the ¯rst period for an unitary
price qk 2 R+. These assets make real promises As;k 2 RL
+ at each state of nature s 2 S. Thus,
when an agent h sells 'h
k units of the primitive k, he pays an amount qk'h
k and he is burden to
constitute a personalized bundle Ck(p0;qk)'h
k. The function Ck : RL
+ £ R+ ! RL
+ denotes the
price-dependent rule to constitute the unitary collateral requirement on asset k, which all agents
take as given.4
Our approach includes the case considered by Geanakoplos and Zame [11], Ck(p0;qk) = Ck, in
which the collateral requirements do not depend on the price level. Moreover, as in Araujo, P¶ ascoa
and Torres-Mart¶ ³nez [3], we can consider the case in which, except for some upper and lower bounds,
the value of the collateral requirements maintain a ¯xed margin f over the asset price, where the













Ck(p0;qk)l = 0; 8l 6= 1:
Furthermore, we suppose that, at each state s 2 S, the agents can be burdened not only by
the seizure of the depreciated bundle of collateral, but also by other non-economic mechanisms,
which are incorporated in their preferences. These mechanisms, analogous to utility penalties in
Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik [7], can induce the agents to pay more than the collateral value at
t = 1. Hence, an agent h, who borrows 'h
k units of k, delivers, at each state s 2 S, a non-negative
amount ±h
s;k, which is chosen jointly with the portfolio and consumption allocations and satisfy
±h
s;k ¸ minfpsAs;k; psYsCk(p0;qk)g'h
k:
In real markets, ¯nancial institutions use both primitive promises and pass-through securities as
collateral for CLO. For sake of simplicity, we suppose that CLO are backed only by the original
promises. Therefore, we suppose that primitives in K are divided into two disjoint sets AP and AC.
Promises in AP will back pass-through securities while promises in AC will secure collateralized
loan obligations. Moreover, families of securities are backed by classes of primitives. Thus, we
suppose that the sets Ai, i 2 fP;Cg, are partitioned, exogenously, into ³i disjoint classes A
g
i ½ Ai,
i 2 fP;Cg and g 2 f1;2;:::;³ig. For notation convenience, when there is no possibility of mistakes,
we refer to a generic class A
g
i as Ai.
The promises within each class Ai; i 2 fP;Cg, are pooled by a ¯nancial intermediary that issues a
¯nite collection, J(Ai), of short-lived (asset-backed) real assets, denoted by j 2 J(Ai). For notation
4Although, in their model of exogenous collateral, Geanakoplos and Zame [11] allow lenders to hold part of the
collateral requirements, in our case it is not clear what would be the rule for distributing collateral bundles among
investors, because we allow a pool of primitive promises. Thus, we suppose that the physical guarantees are both
constituted and held by debtors.M. Steinert and J.P. Torres-Mart¶ ³nez 7
convenience, we will denote by J the collection of all derivatives that can be traded on the markets
and by n(Ai) = #J(Ai) the number of derivatives associated to the class of primitives Ai.
Pass-through Securities: Given a class AP ½ AP, each derivative j 2 J(AP) makes individual
real promises As;j 2 RL
+ at each state s 2 S, and can be bought at prices qj at the ¯rst period.
There are no priorities among the di®erent claims j 2 J(AP) and, therefore, each Pass-through
receives a pro rata share of the total deliveries made by the primitive assets k 2 AP.
As markets are anonymous (i.e. lenders do not know the identity of the borrowers), agents ex-
pect to receive, for each traded unit of the asset j 2 J(AP), a percentage rs;j of the promises As;j.
However, as agents know that derivatives in J(AP) are pass-through securities, they expect identical
anonymous payment rates for each of them, that is, rs;j = rs;j0 for all derivatives j and j0 in J(AP).
For sake of simplicity, we denote the payment rate, common to all the derivatives in a family J(AP),
as rs;AP. Thus, if an agent h buys µh
j units of j 2 J(AP), for some AP ½ AP, he pays an amount
qj µh
j and expects to receive, at each state s 2 S, an amount rs;AP psAs;j µh
j .
Collateralized Loan Obligations: Given a class AC ½ AC, the family of derivatives J(AC) is
given by J(AC) := fj1(AC);j2(AC);:::;jn(AC)(AC)g; where the CLO jm(AC) has priority over the
assets (jr(AC))r>m in relation to promise payments. Analogous to Pass-through securities, each
tranche j 2 J(AC) makes individual real promises As;j 2 RL
+ at every state s 2 S and can be bought
at prices qj at the ¯rst period.
Now, as lenders know the securitization structure (i.e., they know what the priorities are among
assets in the same family), but markets are anonymous, they expect to receive for each traded
unit of the asset j 2 J(AC) a percentage of the original promises, given by anonymous payment
rates rs;j. As tranches with lower priority levels su®er default before those with higher priority
levels, if a tranche jm(AC) pays in full at state s 2 S, rs;jm(AC) = 1, then all the derivatives
jm
0
(AC), with m0 < m, pay in full too, rs;jm0(AC) = 1. Moreover, if an asset jm(AC) gives a
partial default, rs;jm(AC) 2 (0;1), then all the tranches with higher priority over it pay in full (i.e.
rs;jm0(AC) = 1, for m0 < m) and all the derivatives that are subordinated to jm(AC) give total
default (i.e. rs;jm0(AC) = 0, for m0 > m). Therefore, we can suppose that the anonymous payment
rates, for the derivatives in the class J(AC), belong, at each state of nature, to the non-convex set
R(AC) :=
n
r = (rm) 2 [0;1]
n(AC) : 9m; 1 · m · n(AC);
¡









It is important to remark that the anonymous payment rates, for both pass-through securities
and CLO, are taken as given by the agents, but in equilibrium they are determined in such way
that, at each node, the total value of the deliveries will be equal to the total payments.
As it was mentioned above, each agent h 2 H is characterized by preferences that may depend
on the real amount of default. Formally, denoting the total real default made by an agent, in each
primitive asset and at each state, by d = (ds;k)(s;k)2S£K 2 R
S£K
+ , we suppose that for each h there8 Asset Backed Securitization
exists a correspondence Qh : X £ R
K£S
+ ³ X £ R
K£S
+ ; that represents the agent's preferences over
consumption bundles and amounts of default, in the sense that Qh(x;d) denotes the collection of
plans (x0;d0) that are strictly preferred to (x;d) by agent h. Note that with this characterization of
agents preferences we do not need to assume completeness, transitivity or continuity.




for a given collection of numbers ¸h
s;k 2 R+, we can put
Qh (x;d) ´
(
















to recover the representation of preferences used by Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik [7], in which an
agent h feels a utility level of consumption given by Uh and is burdened by utility penalties propor-
tional to the real amount of default. Moreover, given a strictly monotonic set function ­h : X ³ X,
we can de¯ne the individual preferences Qh(x;d) := ­h(x)£R
K£S
+ in order to have a representation
of preferences (possibly non-ordered) in a model in which the only enforcement in case of default
is given by the seizure of collateral guarantees. Of course, the traditional analytic representation
of preferences by utility functions, as in Geanakoplos and Zame (2002), is a particular case putting
­h(x) :=
©
x0 2 X : Uh(x0) > Uh(x)
ª
:
Finally, as agents are price takers, given commodity prices p = (ps)s2S¤, a price vector for
both primitive and derivative assets q = (qk;qj)k2K;j2J, and anonymous payment rates for the













































k; 8(s;k) 2 S £ K:
























5; 8s 2 S:
When commodity-¯nancial prices are (p;q), and rates of payment are r, the budget set of the
agent h 2 H, denoted by Bh(p;q;r), is given by the collection of consumption-¯nancial allocationsM. Steinert and J.P. Torres-Mart¶ ³nez 9
(xh;'h;±h;µh) that satis¯es equations (1) to (4).
It follows from the considerations above that our Economy with Asset Backed Securitization
E(S¤;H;L;F) is characterized by the set of all states of nature S¤ = f0g[S, the set of agents char-
acteristics H = (X;Qh;mh)h2H, the physical market structure L = (L;(Ys)s2S;(Ws)s2S¤) and the






In order to de¯ne equilibrium, we must make clear what the agents optimality condition is in the
context of our general preferences. Although the preferences depend only on consumption bundles
and real default, the levels of default are not direct decision variables of the agents. However, since
each agent is rational, he can perfectly foresee the real default generated by any allocation in his
budget set, allowing him to realize which allocations are strictly preferred to any consumption-
¯nancial allocation.
More formally, given commodity prices for the states of nature in the second period, p¡0 =
[(ps)s2S], when an agent h chooses a short position 'h
k on primitive k and chooses payments (±h
s;k)s2S,











where, as in Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik [7], the vector vs 2 RL
++ is exogenously given and
allows the agents to measure the amount of default in real terms.
Therefore, as traders are price takers, given a consumption and ¯nancial allocation (xh;'h;±h;µh)
in X := Xh £ Rk £ R
K£S
+ £ RJ
+, the agent h can determine the consumption and default allocation











Thus, each agent knows the set of feasible consumption and default allocations T(p¡0; Bh(p;q;r)).
Therefore, given prices (p;q) and anonymous rates of payment r, an allocation (xh;'h;±h;µh) will









That is, it does not exist an allocation in the budget set that generates a consumption-default alloca-
tion that is strictly preferred to the consumption and default allocation generated by the allocation10 Asset Backed Securitization
(xh;'h;±h;µh).5
We can now de¯ne the concept of equilibrium in the economy with asset-backed securitization.
Definition 1. An equilibrium for the economy E(S¤;H;L;F) is given by prices and rates of payment








] 2 X; for each agent
h 2 H, such that













s = Ws + Ys(W0); 8s 2 S:














= ; 8h 2 H:
(D) For each Ai ½ Ai, with i 2 fP;Cg, the value of derivatives aggregate purchases must match














(E) At each state s 2 S and for each class Ai ½ Ai, with i 2 fP;Cg, the total payments of the















(F) At each state s 2 S and for each class Ai ½ Ai, with i 2 fP;Cg, the payment rates must be
consistent with the ¯nancial structure,
rs;j = rs;AP; 8j 2 J(AP); 8AP ½ AP;
(rs;j)j2J(AC) 2 R(AC); 8AC ½ AC:
Remark 3 (Equilibrium Rates of Payment and Assets Pricing). It follows from equilibrium condi-
tions (E) and (F) that, if a pass-through derivative j 2 J(AP) is negotiated and, at state s 2 S, the
value of its promises is strictly positive, then the rate of payment rs;AP is given by the ratio between
the total deliveries made by borrowers and the total payments received by lenders. Furthermore,








= ;, since we
want to make clear the relationship between our framework and Dubey, Geanakoplos e Shubik [7] model, letting
the agents have the same decision variables as in their model. We are aware that some readers could ¯nd more
natural to allow agents to choose directly the variables (x;';d;µ), instead of (x;';±;µ), where d denotes the real
amount of default. In this context, we would have to rede¯ne our budget set, and the optimality condition would be
Qh(xh;dh)\Bh
x;d(p;q;r) = ;, where Bh
x;d(p;q;r) is the projection of the new budget set in the variables (x;d). How-
ever, this approach may generate technical problems on the proof of lower hemicontinuity of budget correspondences,
if preferences are de¯ned, as it is natural, only over non-negative amounts of default.M. Steinert and J.P. Torres-Mart¶ ³nez 11
given a tranche jm(AC), the equilibrium rate of payment rs;jm(AC), when it is negotiated (and the
values of its promises is strictly positive), takes into account the payments made to the previous


































Finally, it is important to remark that the existence of extra-economic enforcements can allow bor-
rowers to raise more capital than the collateral value. However, if extra-economic penalties do not
exist, the value of the unitary physical collateral will be, at equilibrium, strictly greater than the
value of the asset. In other case, when an agent makes the joint operation of buying the collateral
and selling the promises, he has an arbitrage opportunity, since he raises non-negative transfers
today, receives non-negative returns tomorrow and has the right to consume the collateral require-
ments.
4. Collateral Avoids Over-pessimistic Beliefs
Our de¯nition of equilibrium could generate misleading results. When agents are allowed to have
pessimistic beliefs about the future derivatives rates of payment, it is always possible to trivially
guarantee the existence of an equilibrium. In fact, suppose that the price of primitives and the
rates of payment of derivatives are equal to zero, i.e. (qk;rs;j)(s;j;k)2S£J£K = 0. Since an agent h
does not expect to receive any payment if he buys a derivative, he has no incentive to do it, so the
allocation µ
h
= 0 is optimal. Similarly, since primitive assets have zero price, 'h = 0 is optimal for
each agent h 2 H. Furthermore, as agents will not have any promise to pay at the second period,
±
h
s;k = 0, for all s 2 S and k 2 K, is also optimal. Therefore, the model becomes equivalent to a
general equilibrium model with durable goods and without ¯nancial markets. Existence of a pure
spot market equilibrium in this framework is not di±cult to prove.
Note that, when over-pessimistic beliefs are allowed, the proof mentioned above would be as good
as any other. Thus, it would not be satisfactory to guarantee the existence of equilibrium without
excluding this possibility.
It is worth to note that this problem is not idiosyncratic to our model. In fact, it should be
considered at every model in which agents take the payment rates of assets promises as given.
Although the expected rates of payment are determined endogenously in equilibrium, if derivatives
are not traded, any rate of payment is consistent with equilibrium. Thus, agents could be extremely
pessimistic, believing that no deliveries would be made in any state, for any asset, which in turn
leads to non-negotiation of derivatives.
In their seminal paper, Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik [7] address this topic proposing a re¯ned
equilibrium concept in order to avoid these over-pessimistic beliefs. They de¯ne a "-boosted equi-
librium as an equilibrium of an abstract economy, in which exists an external agent who buys and
sells " units of each asset (that may be interpreted as a government that guarantees an in¯nitesimal
minimum delivery rate), and always delivers the total promises, injecting new commodities in the12 Asset Backed Securitization
economy. Therefore, lenders are not over-pessimistic and the rates of payment at each "-boosted
equilibrium are strictly positive. When " goes to zero, they obtain a re¯ned equilibrium.
In their re¯nement, Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik [7] use the touch of optimism introduced by
the "-agent to banish extremely pessimistic beliefs about the future rates of default. In our model,
however, physical collateral requirements introduce a new dimension: it is natural to suppose lenders
will expect to receive positive payments when the depreciated collateral bundles of the underling
primitives are di®erent from zero. In this sense, collateral avoids over-pessimistic belief without
having to use an external agent.
More formally, we propose another re¯nement concept in which we guarantee that, at each state
of nature: (i) equilibrium payment rates are strictly positive for the Pass-through securities that
are backed by debt contracts that, independent of the structure of extra-economic penalties, give
positive returns, (ii) when primitives associated with a CLO give positive returns, independent of
extra-economic enforcements, the most senior tranche, which made non zero promises at this state,
has non-zero anonymous payment rate, (iii) when some derivative has a positive rate of payment,
at least one of the primitives that backs it has positive price. That is,




)h2H] is non-trivial if the expected payment
rates are not over-pessimistic. That is,












9k0 2 AP; qk0 > 0
¤
;









AC > 0; 8m · m?¤
^
£
9k0 2 AC; qk0 > 0
¤
;
where m? := minfm : kAs;jm(AC)k1 6= 0g:
We are only interested in equilibria in which agents anticipate that derivatives deliveries are
strictly positive when physical collateral requirements of underling primitives do not disappear from
the economy. Therefore, derivatives have non-zero equilibrium rates of payments whenever the
minimum possible payment of their underling primitive assets is strictly positive. Moreover, a class
of primitives that backs derivatives with non-trivial rates of payments has at least one asset with
non-zero price.
Note that it would not be reasonable to ask agents to expect more optimistic rates of payment,
since they do not know what is the total amount of primitives that was sold by the borrowers. In
fact, rates of payment depend, in equilibrium, on both the total units of primitives sold and the
total units of derivatives bought (see Remark 3 above).
Furthermore, in the framework of Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik [7] it is not possible to im-
plement our re¯nement concept of equilibrium, because their loans are not backed by physical
requirements and, hence, the minimum deliveries are always zero.
Finally, note that even with our re¯nement concept, it is possible that at equilibrium it does
not exists a class of primitives that satis¯es the conditions stated in De¯nition 2. In this case, aM. Steinert and J.P. Torres-Mart¶ ³nez 13
pure spot market equilibrium can be assured in a trivial manner and, as we say above, our proof is
super°uous. Hence, we discuss in Remark 4 (after the statement of the assumptions) the character-
istics over the ¯nancial structure that guarantee that a family of derivatives has, in any equilibrium,
non-trivial rates of payments.
5. Equilibrium Existence
In order to guarantee the existence of a non-trivial equilibrium, we will make the following
assumptions.
Assumption 1.
For each agent h 2 H and each state of nature s 2 S¤, the income function mh
s(p) is continuous,
strictly positive ( mh




s(ps) = psWs; for all ps 2 RL
+:
As it was mentioned before, this ¯rst hypothesis is weaker than the usual strong survival assump-
tion used in the general equilibrium literature. We are only assuming that whenever the prices are
not all equal to zero, agents will have some income. Hence, we are not interested how agents obtain
their incomes (we can even think that there exists some kind of central planner that does not allow
anyone to starve). Moreover, we also assume that the aggregate income of agents matches the total
value of the endowment available in the economy.
Assumption 2.
For each agent h 2 H, the correspondence Qh : X £ R
K£S
+ ³ X £ R
K£S
+ has open graph, is
irre°exive (that is, (x;d) = 2 Qh(x;d) for all (x;d)), has convex-values, and satis¯es the following
conditions:
(i) strictly monotonicity on (xs)s2S¤, that is, (x0;d) 2 Qh(x;d), for all x0 > x;
(ii) if (x0;d0) 2 Qh(x;d), then for all d00 < d0, (x0;d00) also belongs to Qh(x;d);
where, given vectors w and z in an Euclidean space, w > z is de¯ned as wi ¸ zi for all i and
wi0 > zi0 for at least one i0.
As noted above, we are not assuming that individual preferences are complete, transitive nor
continuous. Moreover, the assumptions made over correspondences Qh can appear to be too de-
manding, since we assume open graph instead of lower hemicontinuity with open values as usual.
However, we need this assumption, as well as item (ii), in order to use the Gale and Mas-Collel
Fixed Point Theorem in the proof of our main result (see Appendix).
Assumption 3.
The collateral requirements functions Ck : RL
+£R+ ! RL
+ are continuous and di®erent from zero
in their domain. Moreover, for each primitive k 2 K, the function Ck, if it is not constant, satis¯es
YsCk(p0;qk) 6= 0 for all (p0;qk) 2 RL
+ £ R+ and for each s 2 S.14 Asset Backed Securitization
Thus, when collateral requirements depend on price levels, the commodities that are used as
guarantees will be non-perishable. Moreover, it is important to remark that physical collateral
requirements, which act as enforcement mechanisms in case of default, also guarantee that at equi-
librium short sales of primitives are bounded.6
Assumption 4.
Given an agent h 2 H and given ² > 0, there exists, for each (xh;dh) 2 X £ R
S£K
+ and for each
pair (s;l) 2 S¤ £ L, a constant Zh




²; if (s0;l0) 6= (s;l);
Zh
s;l(xh;dh;²); if (s0;l0) = (s;l);
is strictly preferred to (xh;dh), i.e. (yh;0) 2 Qh(xh;dh). Moreover, the functions
Zh
s;l : X £ R
K£S
+ £ R++ ! R++;
are non-decreasing in x, and non-increasing in d.
This assumption guarantees that all equilibrium commodity prices are uniformly bounded from
below at each state of nature s 2 S¤ (see Appendix). This property on prices is su±cient to assure
that there exists an equilibrium with non-trivial rates of payment.7
Assumption 5.
Assets are non-trivial, in the sense that, for each k 2 K (respectively, for each j 2 J), the vector
of real promises Ak = (As;k)s2S (respectively, Aj = (As;j)s2S) is di®erent from zero. Moreover, for
6If we had let the collateral bundle to be zero (i.e. in case of default, only extra-economic penalties burden agents
payments), then we would have to suppose that primitives short sales are exogenously bounded in order to guarantee
existence of an equilibrium. Moreover, for this kind of asset, it would never be possible to guarantee, using our proof
of equilibrium, that rates of payments of its associated derivatives are strictly positive.























where Uh : RL£S¤
+ ! R+ and ¸h
s;k 2 R+, Assumption 4 is implied by their hypothesis in utilities,
limjjzjj1!+1 Uh(z) = +1: In fact, our condition is weaker, because we do not need to assume, for instance,
that Uh(a;0;:::;0) goes to in¯nity when a 2 R+ goes to in¯nity.
Moreover, these authors use the assumption of unbounded utilities to prove that there exists an equilibrium even
without interior individual endowments. In our context, Assumption 4 will guarantee that all equilibrium commodity
prices are uniformly bounded from below and, therefore, there exists p > 0 such that, given equilibrium commodity
prices p, we have ps;l ¸ p; for all states of nature s 2 S¤ and for all commodity l 2 L (see Lemma 4 in the Appendix).
Thus, ¯xing endowments wh = (wh
s)s2S¤ 2 RL£S¤
+ , that satisfy for each state of nature
P
h2H wh
s À 0, and restating
our Assumption 1, in order to require that the last condition
P
h2H mh(ps) = psWs only holds for the prices ps ¸ p.




s;l in order to guarantee, as consequence of our main
result, that there exists a non-trivial equilibrium for an economy in which agents are endowed by physical bundles
that do not need to be interior points of RL
+. Note that, in our context in which commodities may be durable, this
property is particularly interesting, because it allows some agents to be endowed, at the states of nature in the second
period, only with perishable commodities.M. Steinert and J.P. Torres-Mart¶ ³nez 15













5; 8s 2 S; 8l 2 L:
This last assumption guarantees that, independently of the price level, one derivative has positive
real promises if and only if at least one primitive also has it.
We can now state our main result,
Theorem. Under Assumptions 1-5 our economy E(S¤;H;L;F) has a non-trivial equilibrium.
Sketch of the proof: We guarantee, in the Appendix, the existence of a non-trivial equilibrium
following the steps below:
¦ We de¯ne, for each agent h 2 H, a correspondence that, given a price vector, associates, to
each consumption-¯nancial allocation, the set of consumption-¯nancial allocations that are strictly
preferred to it. These correspondences are lower hemicontinuous, strictly monotonic, irre°exive
and have open and convex values (see Proposition 1). Moreover, in order to guarantee that agents
budget set correspondences are lower hemicontinuous, we suppose that (i) ¯rst period commodities





for any class Ai ½ Ai, and (iii) the commodities prices at each state in the second period belong to
the simplex.
¦ As we work in an economy in which agents are characterized by non-ordered preferences, we
¯nd an equilibrium using Gale-Mas-Colell Fixed Point Theorem. Thus, we need to truncate our
economy. In this direction, we prove in Lemma 1 that equilibrium allocations are bounded. Hence
we de¯ne, for each M = (M1;M2) 2 R2
+ with M2 > M1, a truncated economy EM that coincides
with the original economy, but has the endogenous variables truncated in the following way: (i)
short sales of primitives, purchases of derivatives and deliveries are bounded using upper bounds
found on Lemma 1; (ii) consumption allocations are bounded by M1; and (iii) the rates of payment
of each derivative are restricted to belong to [¯;1], where the lower bound ¯ is equal to 1
M1, if it
satis¯es one of the re¯nement conditions, and equal to 1
M2 in other case. Note that payment rates
of CLO, associated to AC, are not restricted to belong to R(AC), because this set is not convex.
¦ Furthermore, for each abstract economy, we de¯ne reaction correspondences for the agents, and
abstract reaction correspondences for auctioneers, who choose prices (for commodities and assets)
and rates of payment for the derivatives. The same auctioneer ¯xes the rates of payment for a family
of Pass-troughs and di®erent auctioneers ¯x the rate of payment of each tranche in the same CLO.
Using Gale-Mas-Colell Fixed Point Theorem, we prove that there exists, for each vector (M1;M2)
an equilibrium for the truncated economy EM, in the sense that all reaction correspondences have
empty-value (see Lemma 2).
¦ Now, for M1 su±ciently large, we prove that: (i) agents allocations are feasible and optimal in
the truncated budget set (Lemma 3); (ii) market clearing conditions in the ¯rst period are satis¯ed16 Asset Backed Securitization
for physical and ¯nancial markets (Lemma 3); and (iii) commodities prices are uniformly bounded
from below at each state of nature s 2 S¤ (Lemma 4).
¦ Moreover, Lemma 5 and Lemma 6 prove, using the reaction correspondences of the auctioneers,
for M1 su±ciently large, that (i) Pass-through rates of payment satisfy equilibrium condition (F);
(ii) CLO payment rates belong to a truncated space of payments (that converges to the space R(AC)
when M2 goes to in¯nity); and (iii) the excess of payments received by the lenders over the deliveries
made by the borrowers is bounded by a constant multiplied by 1
M2.
¦ In Lemma 7 we prove that the physical markets excess of demand, at each state in the second
period, is also bounded by a constant multiplied by 1
M2. Furthermore, we guarantee that agents
allocations, obtained as equilibrium for the truncated economies EM, are optimal choices in the
original economy for each M.
¦ Finally, as we have two degrees of freedom, M1 and M2, we prove in Lemma 8 that, for a
su±ciently large M1, when M2 goes to in¯nity the equilibrium of the truncated economies con-
verges to an equilibrium of the original economy. As payment rates of derivatives associated with
primitives that satisfy our re¯nement condition are bounded from below by 1
M1, and optimality
condition implies that there exists at least one primitive that has positive price, we guarantee that
this equilibrium is non-trivial. ¤
Particularly, when the seizure of the collateral requirements, which are independent of prices, is
the only enforcement in case of default, our main result guarantees that there exists a non-trivial
equilibrium in the context of the original Geanakoplos e Zame [11] model, allowing asset-backed
securitization and non-ordered preferences. Moreover, when there is only one derivative associated
with each primitive, we obtain an extension of Geanakoplos and Zame [11] to allow non-ordered
preferences.8
Remark 4 (Assets with Non-trivial Rates of Payment). We can guarantee, independently of the
equilibrium prices, that some derivatives always have positive rates of payment, even if they are
not negotiated. In fact, as we suppose that preferences are strictly monotonic on consumption,
equilibrium commodity prices (if they exist) will be strictly positive, p À 0, which implies that for
each class of primitives Ai, with i 2 fP;Cg, a necessary and su±cient condition to guarantee that
minfpsAs;k;psYsCk(p0;qk)g > 0; 8k 2 Ai ;
is that mink2Ai fjjAs;kjj1;jjYsCk(p0;qk)jj1g > 0: Now, it follows from Assumption 3 that this last
condition does not depend on (p0;qk). In fact, if collateral requirements are price dependent, we
know that their depreciated bundle is, at each state of nature, di®erent from zero, which implies
that the condition above is equivalent to mink2Ai fjjAs;kjj1g > 0: Hence, when collateral are ¯xed,
as in Geanakoplos and Zame [11], a family of derivatives will have positive rates of payment at
8In the context of endogenous collateral models, Martins-da-Rocha and Torres-Mart¶ ³nez [13] also obtain this last
result as a particular case of their main theorem.M. Steinert and J.P. Torres-Mart¶ ³nez 17
some state s 2 S if both mink2Ai fjjAs;kjj1g > 0 and mink2K jjYsCkjj1 6= 0. Therefore, under our
assumptions, the requirement that guarantees that a family of derivatives has a non-zero vector of
rates of payment is independent of equilibrium prices.
6. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we prove that the ¯nancial structures of asset-backed securitization are consistent
with a general equilibrium model in which assets are subject to default and borrowers are enforced
by the seizure of collateral requirements or by extra-economic penalties. Equilibrium exists even
when agents are only characterized by non-ordered preferences, which internalize extra-economic
punishments. Furthermore, we propose a re¯nement concept of equilibrium in order to avoid the
absence of asset trading as consequence of over-pessimism about rates of default. Thus, physical col-
lateral requirements have an important role in order to avoid unduly pessimistic belief on derivatives
rates of default.
Our framework may be extended in some directions. A natural one would be to consider a multi-
period model with long-lived assets. In this context, if we permit borrowers to prepay their debts
before the contracted period, two interesting points would appear. First, how these prepayments are
made and that incentives the borrowers have to make them? Second, how the ¯nancial intermediaries
would reinvest the amount prepaid? Thus, it would be necessary to model the decision making of
the issuers, endogenizing the asset structure, as in DeMarzo and Du±e [5], Allen and Gale [1], and
Diamond [6].
Although in our model collateral requirements can depend on prices, agents do not have the pos-
sibility to choose personalized guarantees. Thus, it is interesting to allow borrowers to endogenously
choose this guarantees in a context with asset-backed securitization. In the particular case in which
primitives within the same class di®er from each other only on physical collateral requirements, we
can argue as in Geanakoplos [10] that this structure approximates an endogenous collateral context.
In fact, assets will be priced in equilibrium and agents will choose the pair of primitive price and
collateral bundle that best suits their interests. Of course, a more realistic endogenous collateral
model, though, would have to allow agents to directly choose the physical collateral requirements,
as in Araujo, Fajardo and P¶ ascoa [2] and Martins-da-Rocha and Torres-Mart¶ ³nez [13].
Furthermore, in DeMarzo and Du±e [5], Araujo, Fajardo and P¶ ascoa [2], and Martins-da-Rocha
and Torres-Mart¶ ³nez [13] the promises made by the borrowers are pooled in only one nominal
security, which incorporates in their promises the default given by the original claims. In this context,
these models suppose that ¯nancial intermediaries issue endogenous asset-backed derivatives. We
can allow this type of structure and the existence of equilibrium will be a direct consequence of
our main result, after rede¯nition of some variables. In fact, when classes of primitives are pooled
in only one derivative, it is su±cient to suppose that agents, instead of taking anonymous rates of
payment as given, observe nominal promises made by the derivatives.
Thus, our model of Asset-Backed Securitization provides a natural framework to study these
extensions and to analyze the advantages of asset backed securitization in order to promote e±ciency.18 Asset Backed Securitization
Appendix: Proof of the Theorem
In order to guarantee the equilibrium existence, we restrict our space of prices. In the ¯rst period, we























where qK = (qk)k2K, qJ = (qj)j2J and, as usual, Ai denotes a generic class of primitives of Ai, with
i 2 fP;Cg. Moreover, we restrict the commodity prices ps, at each state of nature in the second period,
to belong to ¢
#L¡1
+ . For convenience of notation, we denote a generic vector of commodity-¯nancial






h), and by ´ = (´
h)h2H a generic vector of allocations in the economy. Also, let ¥k be





+ £ [0;1] : 9(qJ;qk0)k06=k ;(p0;qK;qJ) 2 ¥
o
:




j2J(Ai) As;j for each Ai ½ Ai with
i 2 fP;Cg and for each s 2 S.





j2J(Ai) As;j, for each Ai ½ Ai with i 2 fP;Cg and for each s 2 S, it
is always possible to ¯nd a non-trivial equilibrium for any economy E
0 in which primitive and derivative
promises only satisfy Assumption 5. In fact, for such E
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s;j, for each Ai ½ Ai with
i 2 fP;Cg and for each s 2 S. If there is an equilibrium (¼;´) for an economy E, which is equal to E
0
except for the derivatives promises, de¯ned as As;j = ¸A
0











) = (p;qK;r ;x;';±), µ
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¸ qJ. One can easily verify that the allocation
(¼
0;´
0) is an equilibrium for the economy E
0.











where the continuous function Tp¡0 : X ! X £ R
K£S
+ is de¯ned by Tp¡0(´
h) := T(p¡0;´
h). It follows that,
given prices (p;q) and rates of payment r, an allocation ´





Proposition 1. Under Assumption 2, for each agent h 2 H, the correspondence ª
h is lower hemicontin-
uous, has convex and open values, is strictly monotonic on (xs)s2S¤, and is irre°exive, in the sense that
´
h = 2 ª
h(p¡0;´





Proof: For convenience of notation, de¯ne F := (¢
#L¡1
+ )
S. Also, we denote by f a generic element of F.
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Step 1 : ª
h has open values. Fix a vector (f;´
h) 2 F £ X. Since Q
h has open values, Q
h(T(f;´
h)) is an
open set. As Tf is continuous, (Tf)
¡1(Q
h(T(f;´
h))) is also open, which implies that ª
h has open values.
Step 2 : ª
h has convex values. Fix a vector (f;´























valued, we know that ¸T(f;´
h




h)). Moreover, by de¯nition of the function













; i 2 f1;2g:
As the functions Ds;k(f;¢) are convex, we have that
¸T(f;´
h




























1 + (1 ¡ ¸)´
h
2)
Therefore, it follows from item (ii) in Assumption 2 that T(f;¸´
h
1 + (1 ¡ ¸)´
h


















Step 3 : ª
h is lower-hemicontinuous. It is su±cient to show that given an (relative) open set U ½ X, the
lower inverse (ª
h)
¡ [U] = f(f;´
h) 2 F £ X : ª
h(f;´
h) \ U 6= ;g; is an (relative) open set of F £ X. If
(ª
h)
¡ [U] is empty, the proof is immediate. Thus, suppose that (ª
h)












h) denotes the open neighborhood (in the Euclidean norm) of (f;´
h) with radius ¹. Now, ¯x




We know that ^ ´
h 2 U and T(f; ^ ´
h) 2 Q
h ± T(f;´








As the correspondence Q















Moreover, as the function T is continuous, there exists ¹ > 0 such that, if (f
0;´
0h) 2 V¹(f;´





















Therefore, for all (f
0;´
0h) 2 V¹(f;´













0h). Finally, as ^ ´
h 2 U, the allocation (f
0;´
0h) belongs to (ª
h)
¡ [U], which concludes the proof
of this step.
The fact that ª
h is strictly monotonic and irre°exive follows directly from properties on Q
h. ¤







£X ³ X, called augmented de-
cision correspondence, as the set function that associates to each vector (p¡0;´




h = ¸~ ´
h + (1 ¡ ¸)´
h for 0 < ¸ · 1; ~ ´
h 2 ª
h(p¡0;´
h):20 Asset Backed Securitization
Note that ª
h(p¡0;´
h) ½ ^ ª
h(p¡0;´
h). Moreover, as noted in Gale-Mas-Colell [8, 9], the correspondence ^ ª
h
preserves all properties of ª
h: it is irre°exive, strictly monotonic and lower hemicontinuous, with open and
convex values (see Proposition above).
Lemma 1. Given prices and rates of payment ¼ = (p;q;r), if individual allocations (´
h)h2H satisfy equilib-
rium conditions (A)-(C) then, for each agent h 2 H, the vector (x
h;'
h;±









h)h2H be a vector that satis¯es the equilibrium conditions (A)-(C). Condition




0 = W0. As each term in the left hand side of the equality
above is non-negative, it follows that, for each commodity l 2 L and for each agent h 2 H, the consumption
allocation satis¯es x
h
0;l · W0;l. Thus, agents consumption bundles are bounded at t = 0. Moreover, it











Since we restrict prices (p0;qk) to the compact set ¥k, it follows from Assumption (3) that there exists
a ¯nite lower bound ck = min(p0;qk)2¥k
P















s = Ws + Ys W0: Since each term on left hand side, in the last equation, is non negative, it
follows that individual consumptions bundles, x
h
s, are bounded.
Finally, as we restrict commodity prices, at each state of nature s 2 S, to belong to the simplex ¢
#L¡1
+ ,
the value of primitive promises, psAs;k'
h
k, is bounded for each (h;k) 2 H £ K. Thus, it follows from equi-
librium condition (C) that borrowers do not have any incentive, at the optimum, to pay more than the face
value of the original promises. Therefore, payments ±
h are bounded from above, node by node, primitive
by primitive. ¤
Now, as consumption allocations, short sales positions and payments are bounded at equilibrium (if it
exists), we will truncate endogenous variables in order to ¯nd an optimal allocation for the economy.
Our goal is to prove that, given upper and lower bounds on allocations, there exists an equilibrium
for a truncated economy (as de¯ned below). Furthermore, we show that this truncated equilibria alloca-
tions converge, when the appropriated limit is taken, to an equilibrium allocation of our original economy
E(S
¤;H;L;F).
The Truncated Economy EM. We de¯ne, for each M 2 M = f(M1;M2) 2 R
2
++ : M1 < M2g,
a truncated economy EM in which the structure of uncertainty and the physical markets are the same
as in E(S
¤;H;L;F). Each agent h 2 H can demand commodities, can sell primitives k 2 K and can






h) 2 X that satis¯es
kx
hk1 · M1; k'
hk1 · 2­; kµ
hk1 · 2(#H)­ and k±
hk1 · 2­ max
(s;k)2S£K
kAs;kk1;
where kk1 denotes the sup-norm and ­ := maxk2K ­k is the maximum of short sales upper bounds de¯ned
at equation (6) on Lemma 1. Moreover, in order to guarantee the existence of a non-trivial equilibrium (asM. Steinert and J.P. Torres-Mart¶ ³nez 21
de¯ned at Section 4), we need to ¯nd a lower bound, above from zero, for the anonymous rates of payment
of the derivatives:
¦ Given a class AC ½ AC of primitives, we de¯ne the truncated space of CLO payment rates as the
set of vectors (rs;jm
AC ) 2 R
n(AC)















M1; if mink2AC fjjAs;kjj1; cs;kg > 0;
1
M2; in other case,



















M2; in other case.






r = (ri) 2 [¯
s
M(AC);1]










M1; if mink2AP fjjAs;kjj1; cs;kg > 0;
1
M2; in other case.
The space of prices and rates of payments ¼ = (p;q;r) is given, in our truncated economy EM, by






















S £ XM ³ XM as the restriction of the correspondence ^ ª
h to the truncated space of allo-
cations XM.
Now, associated to each agent h 2 H, we de¯ne a reaction correspondence Ã
h
M : PM £ X
H





















M(¼) denotes the interior of B
h
M(¼) relative to XM. Reaction correspondences are also de¯ned for
each state s 2 S
¤. Let Ã
0
M : PM £ X
H




























































and, for each s 2 S, let Ã
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where ¼ = (p;q;r) and (rs;j)j2J(AP ) := rs;AP (1;1;:::;1). Finally, given a class AC of primitives, for each
state of nature s 2 S, and for each m 2 f1;2;:::;n(AC)g, we de¯ne the reaction correspondence
Ã
s;jm(AC)





as the set function that associates, to each vector (¼;´) 2 Pm £ X
H


































































2 PM £ X
H
M
at which all the reaction correspondences de¯ned above have an empty value.
Lemma 2. Given a vector M 2 M, if Assumptions 1-3 hold, there exists an equilibrium for the truncated
economy EM.
Proof: Observe that from Assumption 1 and Assumption 3, _ B
h
M(¼) has non-empty values and has open









M )f(s;j)2S£J(AC); AC½ACg satisfy the assumptions of the Gale-Mas-Colell Fixed Point The-
orem (see Gale and Mas-Colell [8, 9]), that is, all correspondences are lower hemicontinuous with convex
and open values, have the same domain, and the product of the image spaces coincides with the domain.









M(¼M;´M), for each agent h 2 H;
- Ã
0





M(¼M;´M) = ; or (pM)s 2 Ã
s
M(¼M;´M), for each state of nature s 2 S;
- Ã
s;AP
M (¼M;´M) = ; or (rM)s;AP 2 Ã
s;AP
M (¼M;´M), for each class of primitives AP ½ AP and state
of nature s 2 S;
- Ã
s;jm(AC)
M (¼M;´M) = ; or (rM)s;jm(AC) 2 Ã
s;jm(AC)
M (¼M;´M), for each state of nature s 2 S, for
each class AC ½ AC and for each m 2 f1;2;:::;n(AC)g.
Clearly it is not possible to ´
h
M = 2 B
h
M(¼M), because in this case it would neither be a ¯xed point, nor




M(¼M;´M) because it contradicts the fact that
´
h
M = 2 ^ ª
h;M((p¡0)M;´
h
M). Thus, we must have Ã
h
M(¼M;´M) = ;, for each agent h 2 H.
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Thus, ((pM)0;qM) = 2 Ã
0
M(¼M;´M) and, therefore, Ã
0
M(¼M;´M) is an empty set. Finally, one can easily






M may not have a ¯xed point.
Then, we must have that Ã
s
M(¼M;´M) = ;, Ã
s;AP
M (¼M;´M) = ; and Ã
s;jm(AC)
M (¼M;´M) = ;. ¤
Now, for convenience of notation, when mistakes are not possible, we suppress the subscript of the alloca-
tions (¼M;´M). So, using this notation, with M 2 M ¯xed, we already know that an equilibrium allocation
for the truncated economy, (¼;´), satis¯es ´
h 2 B
h
M(¼) and ^ ª
h;M(p¡0;´
h) \ _ B
h
M(¼) = ;. Moreover, the
fact that both sets ^ ª
h;M(p¡0;´
h) and _ B
h
M(¼) are open implies that ^ ª
h;M(p¡0;´









M(¼) = ;. Furthermore, since
Ã





















































0;l ¡ W0;l > 0 for some l 2 L. Then, setting p
0
0;l = 1, p
0
0;l0 = 0 for all l
0 6= l,








k for some pair
(k;j) 2 Ai £ J(Ai). Thus, letting p0 = 0, qj = 1, and qj0 = 0 for all j
0 6= j, qk = 1, and qk0 = 0 for all
k













k for each pair (k;j) 2 Ai £ J(Ai), and for all Ai 2 Ai with i 2 fP;Cg.
Lemma 3. There exists M
?
1 > 0 such that, for each M1 > M
?
1, if Assumptions 1-3 hold, each equilibrium
allocations (¼;´) for a truncated economy EM, with M = (M1;M2) 2 M, satis¯es


























k; for each class Ai ½ Ai with i 2 fP;Cg;
(3.5) For each s 2 S and AP ½ AP,

























(3.6) For each s 2 S, AC ½ AC, j





















subject to r 2 [¯
s;m







(3.7) There exists X < M
?
1 such that, for each s 2 S





s;l · Ws;l · X;









































k for each pair (k;j) 2 Ai £ J(Ai), for all Ai ½ Ai, with i 2 fP;Cg.24 Asset Backed Securitization




0;l ¡ W0;l · 0 for l 2 L, there exists M
0
1 such that, for each M1 > M
0
1, an equilibrium consumption
allocation of the truncated economy EM satis¯es x
h
0;l < M1. Thus, given M1 > M
0



































0 such that ^ ´









M(¼). From the strict monotonicity
of ^ ª




M(¼) 6= ;, which contradicts item (3.2). Thus, for each agent
h, the budget constraint for the ¯rst period must hold with equality. Summing over the agents, it follows





















































































































0 · W0 that the left hand side of equation (8) is a sum of non-positive terms. Thus, each





















0;l < W0;l. From equation 8, we must have p0;l = 0. But it follows from the strict monotonicity of
^ ª
h;M on x0;l that B
h
M(¼) \ ^ ª
h;M(p¡0;´
h) 6= ;, which is a contradiction. Therefore, item (3.3) holds.
It follows from Lemma 2 that, given a state of nature s 2 S, a class of primitives AP ½ AP and






































































and (3.5) is proved. With analogous arguments, we can guarantee item (3.6).
Furthermore, given an equilibrium (¼;´) for the abstract economy EM, with M = (M1;M2) and M1 > M
0
1,
we know that Ã
s
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Moreover, it follows from item (3.1) that ´
h 2 B
h











































Letting, at equation (10), p
0
s;l = 1 and p
0
s;l0 = 0 for each l


































which proofs (3.8). As in the economy EM, (a) the positions on primitives, '
h
j, are bounded by above by




j, is bounded by the total short position on




















; 8h 2 H;
which guarantees that consumption allocations x
h
s, s 2 S, are uniformly bounded from above, indepen-
dently of the value of M1 > M
0
1. Moreover, item (3.3) guarantees that ¯rst period consumption alloca-
tions, x
h





1g such that, x
h
s;l · Ws;l · X < M
?
1, for all (s;l) 2 S
¤ £ L, which proofs item (3.7). ¤




It is important to remark that item (3.9) does not enter into the de¯nition of M-semi-equilibrium. Note
that, given M = (M1;M2), it follows from Lemma 3 that, for a given M1 > M
?
1, an M-semi-equilibrium
always exists . For convenience of notation, we also suppress the subscript M on M-semi-equilibrium allo-
cations when mistakes are not possible.




1 such that, if Assumptions 1-4 hold, for each M-semi-equilibrium (~ ¼; ~ ´),
with M = (M1;M2) and M1 > M
??
1 , the commodity prices ~ ps;l, with (s;l) 2 S
¤ £ L, have a uniform lower
bound p, strictly greater than zero and independent of M = (M1;M2).
Proof: Fix M = (M1;M2) with M1 > M
?
1. It follows from (3.7) that, a M-semi-equilibrium allocation
(~ ¼; ~ ´) satis¯es ~ x
h
s;l · X < M1, for all (s;l) 2 S
¤ £ L, which guarantees that ~ ps;l > 0.9 Moreover, it follows
9In other case, as preferences are strictly monotonic on consumption, each agent h 2 H could increase the
consumption of a zero-price commodity, choosing another allocation ^ ´h that improves their situation and still belongs
to the budget set Bh
M(~ ¼), which contradicts item (3.2).26 Asset Backed Securitization







s(ps) > 0, because ¢
#L¡1
+
is compact. Also, de¯ning, for each pair of di®erent commodities (l;l










#L + #J ¡ 1
¶
^ (9(qK;qJ);(p0;qK;qJ) 2 ¥)
¾
;












0(p0) > 0; 8h 2 H:
Given a M-semi-equilibrium (~ ¼; ~ ´) the vector (~ p0; ~ qJ) 2 ¢
#L+#J¡1
+ . Therefore, for a ¯xed l 2 L, in order
to guarantee that ~ p0;l is uniformly bounded independent of M, we have to consider two possibilities, as in
Seghir and Torres-Mart¶ ³nez (2004):
Case I: There exists a commodity l
0 6= l for which ~ p0;l0 ¸
1¡~ p0;l
#L+#J¡1.
In this case, ~ p0 2 G(l;l
0), which implies that m
h
0(~ p0) ¸ m
h































On the other hand, since each consumption allocation (~ x




















0, ~ Z² < M1. Thus, it follows from Assumption 4 and from the optimality condition (3.2) that,
for each ¯xed M-semi-equilibrium with M1 > (M
?
1)
0, ~ Z² >
mh
0
2~ p0;l, which implies that









Case II: There exists an asset j 2 J for which ~ qj ¸
1¡~ p0;l
#L+#J¡1.
De¯ne W 0 = minl2L W0;l. Note that, there always exists an agent h(~ p0) 2 H that can demand
W0
#H
units of each good at the ¯rst period, without making any ¯nancial transaction. In fact, suppose that such
agent does not exist. Then, it follows from the ¯rst period budget constraint that m
h
0(~ p0) < k~ p0k1
W0
#H for all




0(~ p0) ¸ k~ p0k1W 0, which is a contradiction. Moreover,
since we are restricting (p0;qK;qJ) 2 ¥, it follows that there exists k 2 K for which ~ qk ¸
1¡~ p0;l
(#L+#J¡1)#K.
Now, the agent h(~ p0) can demand the bundle ^ x






























> 0, selling ° units of the primitive k, without making any other










; ° · 2­(#H); °As;k · ²
0; 8s 2 S:M. Steinert and J.P. Torres-Mart¶ ³nez 27
Therefore, this allocation belongs to the budget set of agent h(~ p0) and ° is independent on prices. Hence, it











~ p0;l · ~ Z²0, which implies
that




° + (#L + #J ¡ 1)#K ~ Z²0
:
Therefore, Cases I and II imply that the commodity M-semi-equilibrium prices for the ¯rst period (where
M1 > (M
?






Now, since ~ p0;l ¸ p















where ¥1 denotes the set of prices p0 ¸ p
0(1;1;:::;1) such that there exists prices q for which (p0;q) 2 ¥.
Thus, for a given M-semi-equilibrium (~ ¼; ~ ´), with M1 > (M
?
1)0, and for a ¯xed pair (s;l) 2 S £ L, any




















Then, there exist M
??
1 > maxf ~ Z²S;(M
?
1)0g such that it follows from Assumption 4 and from the opti-
mality condition (3.2) that, if M1 > M
??
1 , then ~ Z²S >
mh
s
2~ ps0;l0 . This implies that the commodity M-semi-
equilibrium prices at the second period are uniformly bounded from below by








Therefore, we conclude that, for each M-semi-equilibrium (~ ¼; ~ ´) with M1 > M
??
1 , the commodity prices
(~ ps)s2S¤ satisfy ~ ps;l ¸ p := mins2S¤ p
s: ¤
Now, take M = (M1;M2) 2 M such that M1 > M
??
1 . Fix an M-semi-equilibrium allocation (¸ ¼; ¸ ´)
that also satis¯es item (3.9) (note that, it is su±cient to take an equilibrium of the truncated economy
EM). Given a class of primitives Ai, with i 2 fP;Cg, it follows from items (3.4) and (3.9) that, if there
exists j








j , then ¸ qj0 = 0. Optimality condition on agents
allocations (item (3.2)) implies that, for such j
0, ¸ rs;j0¸ psAs;j0 = 0 for all s 2 S. However, as (i) the payment
rate of j
0 is bounded from below by
1
M2 > 0, and (ii) the commodity prices, at each state s 2 S, are









j for all j;j
0 2 J(Ai), Ai ½ Ai with i 2 fP;Cg. Analogously, if there exists








k0, then ¸ qk = 0.



































all pair (k;j) 2 Ai £ J(Ai) such that the M-semi-equilibrium price ¸ qk is strictly positive.28 Asset Backed Securitization

























k; if ¸ qk > 0;
0; if ¸ qk = 0:
8h 2 H; 8k 2 K;
It follows that the allocation (~ ¼; ~ ´) is still a M-semi-equilibrium. Moreover, for a given class Ai ½ Ai with















k = 0; 8k 2 K; for which ~ qk = 0: (14)




1 such that, for each M = (M1;M2) with M1 > M
???
1 , there exists a
M-semi-equilibrium (~ ¼; ~ ´) in which each class of primitives AP ½ AP has associated anonymous payment
rates (~ rs;j)j2J(AP ); s2S that satisfy (13), (14) and
(5.1) ~ rs;j = ~ rs;j0, for all j;j
























Proof: We already know that, for each M = (M1;M2) with M1 > M
??
1 , there exists a M-semi-equilibrium
that satis¯es equations (13) and (14). Then, for a given M with M1 > M
??
1 , ¯x an M-semi-equilibrium in




~ rs;j = ~ rs;j0; 8j;j
0 2 J(AP);8s 2 S;
which proves item (5.1). As the value of ~ rs;j is independent from j 2 J(AP) we will denote it by ~ rs;AP .













































k = 0 for all
k 2 AP, it follows from item (3.4) and the fact that ~ qj > 0 for j 2 J that
P
h2H ~ µj = 0 for all j 2 J(AP).
Thus, for any r 2 [¯
s
















s;k = 0; 8s 2 S;
and, as a particular case, ~ rs;AP satis¯es the above equation. So, whenever primitives in AP are not negotiated
(5.2) holds.
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M2 and, since (~ ¼; ~ ´) is a M-semi-
equilibrium, we know that
























































































s;k, we have that ~ rs;AP =
1
M2, which implies,
jointly with (16) and (17), that





































k > 0 for some
k 2 AP.




M1. It follows from Assumption 3
that, for each k 2 AP, one of the following two conditions are satis¯ed:
a. YsCk(p0;qk) 6= 0 for all (p0;qk) 2 ¥k and for each s 2 S;
b. Ck(p0;qk) = Ck for all (p0;qk) 2 ¥k.
When item (b) holds, we have that cs;k = cs;k := min(p0;qk)2 ¥k kYsCk(p0;qk)k1 for each s 2 S. On the
other hand, since we restrict (p0;qk) to the compact set ¥k, if item (a) holds, then cs;k > 0. This implies

























































Moreover, we know that &




is strictly positive and it follows from
Assumption 5 that
P
j2J(AP ) kAs;jk1 > 0: Therefore, there exists M
???
1 (AP) > M
??
1 , such that if M 2 M
with M1 > M
???
























































tainable in this case. This implies that ~ rs;AP
P










s;k = 0. If we
take M
???
1 = maxAP ½AP M
???




k > 0 for some k 2 AP. This concludes the proof of Lemma 5. ¤







s;AP )fs2S;AP ½AP g; ¸ ´
0) = (¸ p; ¸ q;(¸ rs;AP )fs2S;AP ½AP g; ¸ ´)
























M (AC);1]. It follows that BM(¸ ¼
0) ½ BM(¸ ¼). Thus, the fact that ¸ rs;j appears
multiplied by As;j and
P
h2H ¸ µj at item (3.6) implies that any (¸ ¼
0; ¸ ´
0) is also a M-semi-equilibrium.




1 such that for each M = (M1;M2) 2 M, with M1 > M
?
1, there
exists a M-semi-equilibrium (~ ¼; ~ ´) in which conditions (5.1) and (5.2) hold, and for each class of primitives
AC ½ AC we have
(6.1) The rates of payment (~ rs;j)j2J(AC) 2 R
s





































Proof: Given M = (M1;M2) 2 M, with M1 > M
???
1 , take a M-semi-equilibrium (¸ ¼; ¸ ´) that satis¯es the
properties (5.1) and (5.2) and equations (13) and (14). We know that such a M-semi-equilibrium exists
from Lemma 5. Thus, consider a di®erent allocation (~ ¼; ~ ´) with
(~ p; ~ q; ~ rs;AP ; ~ ´)fs2S;AP ½AP g = (¸ p; ¸ q;(¸ rs;AP )fs2S;AP ½AP g; ¸ ´)
and
(19) ~ rs;jm(AC) =
8
> > > > > > > <





























jm(AC) 6= 0 ^ kAs;jm(AC)k1 = 0 ^ m 6= 1 ^ ~ rs;jm¡1(AC) 6= 1:
Since (~ ¼; ~ ´) respects equation (18), (~ ¼; ~ ´) is a M-semi-equilibrium and it still satis¯es the properties (5.1)
and (5.2) of Lemma 5 as well as equations (13) and (14). We will show that (~ ¼; ~ ´) satis¯es all conditions of
this lemma.
Fix a class AC ½ AC. We have two cases,




k = 0 for all k 2 AC.
10Equivalently, the set Rs





M(AC) : 9m; 1 · m · n(AC);
¡




rm0 = ¯s;m(AC); 8m0 > m
¢ª
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It follows from item (3.4), and the fact that ~ qj > 0 for j 2 J, that
P
h2H ~ µj = 0 for all j 2 J(AC). Thus,
for any (rs;j)j2J(AC) 2 ¨
s















s;k = 0; 8s 2 S
and, as a particular case, (~ rs;j)j2J(AC) satis¯es the above equation. Consequently, whenever the primitives




j = 0 for all m 2 f1;2;:::;n(AC), it
follows from (19) that ~ rs;jm(AC) = ¯
s;m
M (AC) for all j 2 J(AC). Thus, (~ rs;jm(AC))
n(AC)
m=1 belongs to R
s
M(AC),
and item (6.1) holds whenever the primitives are not negotiated.




k > 0 for some k 2 AC.




j > 0 for all j 2 J(AC). Since (~ ¼; ~ ´) is a M-semi-equilibrium, we know
that




































j > 0 for all j 2 J(AC), we have that F
s;i
AC(~ ¼; ~ ´) = 0 if and only if kAs;ji(AC)k1 = 0.
Now, de¯ne for each state of nature s 2 S the set I
s
AC = fm : kAs;jm(AC)k1 6= 0g.
If I
s
AC is empty, then it follows from (19) that ~ rs;jm(AC) = 1, for all m 2 f1;2;:::;n(AC)g. Thus, item
(6.1) holds in this case. Otherwise, suppose that I
s
AC 6= ; and consider the following claims,


















holds, then ~ rs;jm(AC) = 1, and ~ rs;jm0(AC) = 1 for each m




Proof: As m 2 I
s
AC, if (21) holds, then rs;jm(AC) = 1 is the unique maximizer of the objective function in
(20), and consequently ~ rs;jm(AC) = 1. Now, suppose that there exists m
0 in I
s
AC such that ~ rs;jm0(AC) < 1
and m














which is a contradiction with auctioneer optimality condition (3.6). Therefore, ~ rs;jm0(AC) = 1. £


























AC(~ ¼; ~ ´)


















and ~ rs;jm0(AC) = 1 for each m
0 < m with m
0 2 I
s
AC.32 Asset Backed Securitization
Proof: If (23) is satis¯ed, the global maximum of the objective function (20) is attainable and, therefore,
(24) holds. Moreover, we have that ~ rs;jm(AC) 2 (¯
s;m
M (AC);1). Now, suppose that there exists m
0 < m such
that ~ rs;jm0(AC) < 1 and m
0 2 I
s














which is a contradiction with (3.6). Therefore, ~ rs;jm0(AC) = 1. £




















holds, then ~ rs;jm(AC) = ¯
s;m
M (AC) and ~ rs;jm0(AC) = ¯
s;m0
M (AC) for each m
0 > m with m
0 2 I(AC).
Proof: If (26) holds, then rs;jm(AC) = ¯
s;m
M (AC) is the unique maximizer of objective function in (20)
and, therefore, ~ rs;jm(AC) = ¯
s;m
M (AC). Moreover, since (26) is valid for each m
0 > m, if m
0 2 I(AC), then
~ rs;jm0(AC) = ¯
s;m
M (AC). £
Now, we can easily see that each m 2 I
s
AC satis¯es the conditions of one and only one Claim. Additionally,
the set of m 2 I
s
AC that satis¯es the conditions of a speci¯c Claim may be empty. Moreover, the following
facts are valid:
- There exists at most one m for which conditions of Claim 2 holds.
- If m 2 I
s
AC satis¯es the condition of Claim 1 or 2, then each m




condition of Claim 1.
- If m 2 I
s
AC satis¯es the condition of Claim 2 or 3, then each m




condition of Claim 3.
Therefore, suppose that there exists m 2 I
s
AC that satis¯es the condition of Claim 2. Then, it follows
from items above and (19) that (i) ~ rs;jm0(AC) = 1, for all m
0 < m; (ii) ~ rs;jm(AC) 2 (¯
s;m
M (AC);1); and (iii)
~ rs;jm00(AC) = ¯
s;m00
M (AC), for all m
00 > m. This guarantees that condition (6.1) holds in this case.
If there exists no m 2 I
s
AC that satis¯es condition of Claim 2, we have two possibilities:
- There exists m 2 I
s
AC such that ~ rs;jm(AC) = ¯
s;m




~ rs;jm0(AC) = ¯
s;m0
M (AC)g. Items above guarantee that ~ m satis¯es the condition of Claim 3. This
implies, using (19), that
~ rs;jm0(AC) = 1; 8m
0 < ~ m;
~ rs;jm0(AC) = ¯
s;m0
M (AC); 8m
0 > ~ m:
- All m 2 I
s
AC satisfy ~ rs;jm(AC) = 1. Thus, ~ rs;jm0(AC) = 1, for all m
0 2 f1;2;:::;n(AC)g.
Therefore, condition (6.1) always holds.
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Thus, it follows from (3.6) and (27) that having
P











lead us to a contradiction. Therefore,
P











Now, suppose that mink2AC fjjAs;kjj1; cs;kg > 0 and de¯ne m
¤ = minfm
0 : kAs;jm0(AC)k1 6= 0g. Thus,






M1 for all m · m
¤. Analogously to the
























Therefore, we know that &




is strictly positive and that kAs;jm¤(AC)k1 >

































and it follows from the fact that, for any m < m

















Thus, when mink2AC fjjAs;kjj1; cs;kg > 0, if ~ rs;jm(AC) = ¯
s;m
M (AC), we have that ~ rs;jm(AC) =
1
M2, because
otherwise ~ rs;jm(AC) =
1
M1, which implies that m · m
?, contradicting (28) and (3.6).





m 2 f1;2;:::;n(AC)g and, consequently, if ~ rs;jm(AC) = ¯
s;m
M (AC), then ~ rs;jm(AC) =
1
M2.
Now, it follows from Claims above that
Pm















M2. Thus, de¯ne m



























































which guarantees that item (6.2) always holds.34 Asset Backed Securitization
Therefore, lemma holds taking M
?
1 = maxAC½AC M
?
1(AC). ¤
Lemma 7. For each M = (M1;M2) 2 M with M1 > M
?
1, there exists a M-semi-equilibrium (~ ¼; ~ ´) in which
conditions (5.1), (5.2), (6.1) and (6.2) hold and the following properties are satis¯ed:
















(7.2) For each h 2 H, ^ ª
h(~ p¡0; ~ ´
h) \ B
h(~ ¼) = ;.
Proof: We know from Lemma 6 that there exists, for each M 2 M with M1 > M
?
1, a M-semi-equilibrium
(~ ¼; ~ ´) that satis¯es conditions (5.1), (5.2), (6.1) and (6.2). Therefore, ¯x (~ ¼; ~ ´) in which all the above
properties hold. Item (7.1) follows directly from items (3.8), (5.2) and (6.2).
We already know from item (3.2) that ^ ª
h;M(~ p¡0; ~ ´
h) \ B
h
M(~ ¼) = ;. Suppose that it exists y 2
^ ª
h(~ p¡0; ~ ´
h) \ B
h(~ ¼). It follows from the de¯nition of augmented preferences that for ¸ 2 (0;1] su±-
ciently small, z := ¸y + (1 ¡ ¸)~ ´
h 2 ^ ª
h(~ p¡0; ~ ´
h) and kzk1 < M1, because k~ ´
hk1 < M1. Therefore, as
z 2 B
h
M(~ ¼) we have a contradiction with ^ ª
h;M(~ p¡0; ~ ´
h) \ B
h
M(^ ¼) = ;. This concludes the proof of item
(7.2). ¤
Finally, the proof of Theorem 1 is a direct consequence of Lemma below.
Lemma 8. There exists a non-trivial equilibrium for the economy E(S
¤;H;L;F), which can be obtained as
the limit of a sequence of M-semi-equilibriums when M2 goes to in¯nity and M1 > M
?
1.
Proof: We know from Lemma 7 that there exists, for each M 2 M with M1 > M
?
1, a M-semi-equilibrium
(~ ¼M; ~ ´M) that satis¯es conditions (5.1), (5.2), (6.1), (6.2), (7.1) and (7.2). Thus, ¯x a M1 > M
?
1 and
construct a sequence of M-semi-equilibriums (~ ¼M2; ~ ´M2), indexed only by M2, which satisfy the above
conditions for all M2. It follows from the fact that (~ ¼M2; ~ ´M2) belongs to a compact set, independent of
M2, that there exists a convergent subsequence. We will denote the limit of this subsequence as (^ ¼; ^ ´).
It is straightforward that items (3.3), (3.4) and (5.1) still hold for the limit allocation (^ ¼; ^ ´). Moreover,
one can easily see that at the limit items (3.1), (5.2), (6.2) and (7.1) become, respectively,
(3.1*) For each h 2 H, ^ ´ 2 B
h(^ ¼);





































s;l ¡ (YsW0)l ¡ Ws;l · 0;M. Steinert and J.P. Torres-Mart¶ ³nez 35
where item (3.1*) follows from the closed graph of the budget set correspondence B
h.
Moreover, we know that, for each M2, the second-periods budget constraints are satis¯ed with equality.
Then, the limit second period budget constraints still hold with equality. This fact, jointly with the items






s;l ¡ (YsW0)l ¡ Ws;l = 0:
Note that, every convergent sequence of elements belonging to R
s
M(AC) for each M2 has a limit at R(AC).
This implies that (^ rs;j)j2J(AC) 2 R(AC) for all AC ½ AC and s 2 S. Moreover, it follows from the fact
that M1 is ¯xed and from the de¯nition of R
s
M(AC) that if mink2AC fjjAs;kjj1; cs;kg > 0, for a given class
of primitives AC ½ AC and state s 2 S, we have that (~ rs;jm
AC )M2 ¸
1
M1 for all m · m
? and for all M2,
where m
? := minfm : kAs;jm(AC)k1 6= 0g. Analogously, if mink2AP fjjAs;kjj1; cs;kg > 0, for a given class of
primitives AP ½ AP and state s 2 S, we have that (~ rs;AP )M2 ¸
1
M1















fjjAs;kjj1; cs;kg > 0
¸




which implies, using the fact that ^ ps;l ¸ p, for all (s;l), that
[minf^ psYsCk(^ p0; ^ qk); ^ psAs;kg > 0; 8k 2 AC] ) ^ rs;jm
AC > 0; 8m · m
?;
and
[minf^ psYsCk(^ p0; ^ qk); ^ psAs;kg > 0; 8k 2 AP] ) ^ rs;AP > 0:
In order to prove the optimality of the limit (^ ¼; ^ ´), we will ¯rst show that, for a given agent h 2 H, there is
nothing in the interior of the budget set that is strictly preferred that ^ ´
h. Suppose that there is an allocation
y such that y 2 ^ ª
h(^ p¡0; ^ ´
h) \ _ B
h(^ ¼). Since ^ ª
h is lower hemicontinuous and (~ ¼M2; ~ ´M2) ! (^ ¼; ^ ´), there
exists yM2 2 ^ ª
h((~ p¡0)M2; ~ ´M2) such that yM2 ! y. Since _ BM has open values, for M2 su±ciently large,
yM2 2 ^ ª
h((~ p¡0)M2; ~ ´
h
M2) \ _ B
h(~ ¼M2), which is a contradiction with (7.2). Thus, ^ ª
h(^ p¡0; ^ ´
h) \ _ B
h(^ ¼) = ;.
Moreover, it follows from Lemma 4 that the M-semi-equilibrium commodity prices are lower bounded and,
therefore, the limit allocation has prices strictly greater than zero. This implies that the interior of the limit
budget set has non-empty values, _ B
h(^ ¼) 6= ;. Now, as B
h also has convex values, we have that the closure
of _ B
h(^ ¼) is equal to the original budget set, B
h(^ ¼). Then, it follows that ^ ª
h(^ p¡0; ^ ´
h) \ B
h(^ ¼) = ;. Since
ª
h(^ p¡0; ^ ´
h) ½ ^ ª
h(^ p¡0; ^ ´
h), we have that ª
h(^ p¡0; ^ ´
h)\B
h(^ ¼) = ;. That completes the proof of optimality.
Finally, given a class of primitives Ai, for which there exists at least one derivative j 2 J(Ai) that have
positive rates of payment (in at least one state of nature), optimality conditions on agents allocations guar-
antee that the price ^ qj > 0. Thus, as (^ p; ^ qK; ^ qJ) 2 ¥, there exists at least one primitive k 2 Ai for which
^ qk > 0. This concludes the proof. ¤
References
[1] Allen, F. and D. Gale (2004): \Financial Intermediaries and Markets", Econometrica, 72, 1023-1061.
[2] Araujo, A., J. Fajardo and M. P¶ ascoa (2004): \Endogenous Collateral", Journal of Mathematical Economics,
forthcoming.36 Asset Backed Securitization
[3] Araujo, M. P¶ ascoa and J.P.Torres-Mart¶ ³nez (2004): \Collateral avoids Bubbles in Incomplete Markets", working
paper, PUC-Rio, Brazil.
[4] Border, K. (1985): Fixed Point Theorems with Applications to Economics and Game Theory, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
[5] DeMarzo, P. and D. Du±e (1999): \A Liquidity-based Model of Security Design", Econometrica, 67, 65-99.
[6] Diamond, D. (1984): \Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring", Review of Economic Studies, 51,
393-414.
[7] Dubey, Pr., J. Geanakoplos and M. Shubik (2004): \Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium", Econo-
metrica, forthcoming.
[8] Gale, D. and A. Mas-Colell (1975): \An Equilibrium Existence Theorem for a General Model without Ordered
Preferences", Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2, 9-15.
[9] Gale, D. and A. Mas-Colell (1979): \Corrections to: An Equilibrium Existence Theorem for a General Model
without Ordered Preferences", Journal of Mathematical Economics, 6, 297-298.
[10] Geanakoplos, J. (1996): \Promises Promises", Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1143.
[11] Geanakoplos, J. and W.R. Zame (2002): \Collateral and the Enforcement of Intertemporal Contracts", Yale
University, Mimeo.
[12] Salomon Smith Barney guide to mortgage-backed and asset-backed securities(2001), edited by Lakhbir Haire.
Wiley Finance, John Wiley & Sons.
[13] Martins-da-Rocha, V.F. and J.P.Torres-Mart¶ ³nez (2004): \Endogenous Collateral", working paper, Universite
Paris I.
[14] Seghir, A. and J.P.Torres-Mart¶ ³nez (2004): \Heritage and Default in a Model with Incomplete Demographic
Participation", working paper, PUC-Rio, Brazil.
[15] Tavakoli, J.M. (2003): Collateralized Debt Obligations & Structured Finance, Wiley Finance, John Wiley &
Sons.
[16] Zame, W. (1993): \E±ciency and the Role of Default when Security markets are incomplete", American Eco-
nomic Review, 83, 1142-1164.
Department of Economics, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, PUC-Rio, Rua Marqu^ es
de S~ ao Vicente, 225, G¶ avea, Rio de Janeiro, RJ, 22453-900, Brazil.
E-mail address: mariano@econ.puc-rio.br,
Department of Economics, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, PUC-Rio, Rua Marqu^ es
de S~ ao Vicente, 225, G¶ avea, Rio de Janeiro, RJ, 22453-900, Brazil.
E-mail address: jptorres martinez@econ.puc-rio.br 
 
Departamento de Economia    PUC-Rio 
Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro 
Rua Marques de Sâo Vicente 225  - Rio de Janeiro 22453-900, RJ 
    Tel.(21) 31141078     Fax (21) 31141084 
www.econ.puc-rio.br 
flavia@econ.puc-rio.br 